Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St'át'imcets
Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St'át'imcets
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作为认知模态的证据：来自 Státimcets 的证据
DOI：
10.1075/livy.7.07mat
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Rullmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Matthewson;Henry Davis;H. Rullmann
本文认为，证据clitics在St'at'imcets（a.k.a. Lillooet;北方内陆萨利希语）必须作为认知情态动词来分析。我们应用了一系列测试来区分情态分析和主要的替代竞争者（一种以言行事的算子分析，如Faller 2002），并表明St'at'imcets的证据量服从情态分析的预测。我们的研究结果支持了越来越多的证据表明，编码信息源和认知模态的功能不一定是不同的。St'at'imcets的数据进一步提供了一个新的论点，反对证据和认知情态是独立的类别。许多作者认为，证据与情态动词的不同之处在于，前者不编码说话者的确定性（见，例如，de哈安1999; Aikhenvald 2004）。我们认为，情态也不需要编码扬声器的确定性，我们提供的证据，从St'at'imcets，标记量化强度不是一个固有的属性的情态元素。
This paper argues that evidential clitics in St’at’imcets (a.k.a. Lillooet; Northern Interior Salish) must be analyzed as epistemic modals.We apply a range of tests which distinguish the modal analysis from the main alternative contender (an illocutionary operator analysis, as in Faller 2002), and show that the St’at’imcets evidentials obey the predictions of a modal analysis. Our results support the growing body of evidence that the functions of encoding information source and epistemic modality are not necessarily distinct. The St’at’imcets data further provide a novel argument against the claim that evidentiality and epistemic modality are separate categories. Many authors argue that evidentials differ from modals in that the former do not encode speaker certainty (see, e.g., de Haan 1999; Aikhenvald 2004).We argue that modals are also not required to encode speaker certainty; we provide evidence from St’at’imcets that marking quantificational strength is not an intrinsic property of modal elements.