Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
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预算平衡、公平和最小可操纵性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lars
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tommy Andersson;Lars Ehlers;Lars
现实生活中一个常见的问题是在一组代理人之间公平地分配一些不可分割的对象和固定数量的钱。公平性要求每一个代理人对他的消费束的偏好弱于任何其他代理人的消费束。在公平的前提下，效率等同于货币平衡（所有可用的钱都在代理人之间分配）。一般而言，预算平衡和公平与不可操纵性是不相容的（绿色和Laffont，1979年）。我们提出了一个新的概念，可操纵性的程度，可用于比较容易操纵的分配机制。我们的措施计数每个问题的代理人谁可以操纵规则的数量。在此基础上，证明了最大链接公平分配规则是所有非均衡公平分配机制中可操作性最小的规则。这些规则通过无差异性将任何代理人与预先选定的代理人捆绑在一起（这可以被视为间接的平等主义等价）。
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).