Government transparency and policymaking
Government transparency and policymaking
复制标题
政府透明度和政策制定
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Fox
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Fox
我们认为，通过让立法者更容易确定他们的政策选择来让他们对公众更加负责，可能会产生负面后果。具体来说，我们分析了具有单一立法者和代表性选民的政治机构模型。在我们的模型中，立法者比选民更了解替代政策课程的适当性。此外，选民不确定现任者的政策偏好——具体来说，选民担心现任者是一个空想家。我们的模型表明，当立法者期望他们的政策选择得到广泛宣传时，对于那些充分关心连任的立法者来说，选择让公众相信他们是公正的政策的愿望将胜过选择最适合其选民的政策的动机。因此，当政策公开制定时，本来会在私下做正确事情的立法者可能不再这样做。
We argue that making lawmakers more accountable to the public by making it easier to identify their policy choices can have negative consequences. Specifically, we analyze a model of political agency with a single lawmaker and a representative voter. In our model, the lawmaker has better information than the voter about the appropriateness of alternative policy courses. In addition, the voter is uncertain about the incumbent's policy preferences – specifically, the voter is worried the incumbent is an ideologue. Our model suggests that when lawmakers expect their policy choices to be widely publicized, for those lawmakers sufficiently concerned about reelection, the desire to select policies that lead the public to believe they are unbiased will trump the incentive to select those policies that are best for their constituents. Hence, lawmakers who would do the right thing behind close doors may no longer do so when policy is determined in the open.