A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
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DOI：
10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z
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发表时间：
2009-06-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Broome, Matthew
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bortolotti, Lisa;Broome, Matthew
哲学家们对思想插入现象很感兴趣，因为它挑战了一个普遍的假设，即一个人可以把他可以第一次亲自接触到的思想归因于自己。在思想插入的标准哲学分析中，主体拥有“插入”的思想，但缺乏对它的代理感。在本文中，我们希望提供一个替代的分析条件，根据该条件，主体通常缺乏“插入”思想的所有权和作者身份。我们认为，通过诉诸所有权和作者身份的失败，我们可以更准确地描述思想插入的现象学，并将其与没有经过深思熟虑的非妄想性信念以及其他被动性妄想区分开来。我们也可以开始对正常认知和异常认知中的意向性、理性和自我认识之间的关系进行一种心理学上更现实的解释。
Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'inserted' thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.