I—The Humean Thesis on Belief
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief
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I——休谟信仰论题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8349.2015.00248.x
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Leitgeb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Leitgeb
本文提出了（理性）全有或全无信念和信念程度的桥梁原则，其效果是信念对应于稳定的高度信念。讨论了使休谟关于信仰的命题变得精确的不同方法，其中一种方法通过统一其他方法而脱颖而出。事实证明，该论文的最终版本在实现信念的逻辑封闭、关于信念的洛克理论以及基于全有或全无信念和信念程度的决策之间的一致性方面是卓有成效的。
This paper suggests a bridge principle for (rational) all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief to the effect that belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. Different ways of making this Humean thesis on belief precise are discussed, and one of them is shown to stand out by unifying the others. The resulting version of the thesis proves to be fruitful in entailing the logical closure of belief, the Lockean thesis on belief, and coherence between decision-making based on all-or-nothing beliefs and on degrees of belief.