Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
复制标题
DOI：
10.1063/1.3597221
复制
发表时间：
2011-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Z. Yuan;J. Dynes;A. Shields
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Z. Yuan;J. Dynes;A. Shields
半导体雪崩光电二极管（APD）通常用于量子密钥分配中的单光子检测。最近，已经提出了许多使用明亮照明的攻击来操纵门控InGaAs APD。为了制定有效的应对措施，必须对这些攻击进行仔细分析，以区分不正确的操作和真正的漏洞。在这里，我们证明了正确操作的门控APD对连续波照明攻击具有免疫力，而监测光电流的过高值是针对使用时间定制光的攻击的直接对策。
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective counter-measures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly-operated, gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high values is a straightforward counter-measure against attacks using temporally tailored light.