International environmental agreements with support
International environmental agreements with support
复制标题
国际环境协定的支持
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
C. Withagen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Ansink;H. Weikard;C. Withagen
我们从非合作联盟理论中扩充了标准的卡特尔形成游戏，该理论经常应用于国际环境协议的背景下，有可能单身人士支持联盟形成，而不是自己成为联盟成员。我们假设他们的支持是以向联盟转移资金的形式，以诱导更大的联盟、更高水平的公共利益提供和更高的回报。我们证明，在为公共利益做出贡献(例如减少温室气体排放)的成本和收益方面，在温和的条件下，存在支持的均衡。允许提供支持会增加对三种类型的代理人的回报：会员、支持者和搭便车者。
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.