"Will" and "Ishi" : Explanation of Action in Cross-Cultural Perspectives
"Will" and "Ishi" : Explanation of Action in Cross-Cultural Perspectives
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“意志”与“毅”：跨文化视角下的行动阐释
DOI：
10.18999/jousl.7.1
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Tamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Tamura
当用来指代个人的决策能力时，名词“will”没有复数形式，这可以看作是英语中的一个事实。罗杰斯·阿尔布里顿说：“人没有遗嘱。”然而，绝大多数以日语为母语的人认为一个人的以志可以成倍增长--一个人可以有复数的以志。当一个人的意志力成倍增长时，一个困难就出现了：如何弥合价值和行动之间的鸿沟？根据山崎雅树的说法，一个人每次做一个动作，都会有一个隐藏的、看不见的场景埋在他或她周围的环境中。场景中的动作是代理人和环境共同作用的产物。引发行动的不是内在的意志力，而是动因内外的整体情况。在西方的思想路线中，个人的意志在定义上是单一的。如果应该建立单一意志，即决策能力，就会出现另一个困难：我们如何解释意志令人恼火的弱点？这个问题本质上与我们试图解释通过考虑如此多的欲望和信念来做出最终决定的程序是相同的；也就是说，一个人如何弥合价值和行动之间的潜在差距？当我们放弃意志的单一性的民间心理学或个体的民间形而上学时，我们可以清楚地看到，一个人可能有不同的理性欲望，一些环境因素决定了哪些欲望将被实现。在我看来，实验哲学家需要专注于人类的这种环境条件。
It can be regarded as a fact of English usage that the noun “will” does not have a plural form when used in reference to the decision-making faculty of an individual. Rogers Albritton puts it: “One does not have wills.” However, the great majority of those who speak Japanese as their mother tongue think a person’s ishi (one’s will) can be multiplied—one can have plural ishi (wills). Where a person’s ishi (will) is multiplied, a difficulty appears: how does one bridge the gap between valuing and doing? According to Yamazaki Masakazu, every time a person performs an action, there is a hidden, invisible scenario buried in the circumstances around him or her. The action in the scene is a collaborative product of an agent and circumstances. It is not the inner ishi (will) but the total situation in and out of the agent that gives rise to the action. An individual’s will is singular by definition in the Western line of thought. If the singular will, the faculty of decision making, should be established, there appears another difficulty: how can we explain the annoying weakness of the will? This problem is essentially the same as the one encountered when we try to explain the procedure of coming to a final decision through the consideration of so many desires and beliefs; that is, how does one bridge the potential gap between valuing and doing? When giving up the folk-psychology of the singularity of the will, or the folk-metaphysics of the individual, we may clearly see that a person may have diverse rational desires and that some circumstantial element determines which of the desires is to be brought into reality. In my opinion, experimental philosophers are required to focus on such circumstantial conditions of humanity.