Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness
Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness
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出口补贴作为竞争力的信号
DOI：
10.2307/3440359
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Hviid
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Collie;M. Hviid
在国内外企业国际竞争的古诺双头垄断模型中，表明当外国企业对国内企业边际成本的信息不完整时，国内政府可以使用出口补贴来表明其企业的竞争力。这种信号效应强化了通常的出口补贴利润转移论点。信号均衡下的最优出口补贴可能是完全信息下最优利润分享出口补贴的两倍。版权所有 1993，斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志编辑。
In a Cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm, it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm. This signaling effect strengthens the usual profit-shifting argument for an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy in the signaling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit-sharing export subsidy under complete information. Copyright 1993 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.