Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials
Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials
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失业风险和工资差异
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ludo Visschers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roberto B. Pinheiro;Ludo Visschers
从事不太安全工作的工人的工资通常低于从事较安全工作的相似工人的工资。我们表明，当所有工人都是相同的并且企业仅在工作保障（即工人不陷入失业的概率）方面有所不同时，这种失业风险补偿差异的缺乏可能会在均衡中出现。在工人在工作内外寻找新职位的情况下，工人为工作保障支付的边际意愿是内生的：它取决于劳动力市场上所有公司的行为，并随着用人公司留给工人的租金而增加。我们求解了劳动力市场均衡，发现至少对于处于企业层面失业风险分布的风险尾部的所有企业来说，工资随着工作保障的增加而增加。与此同时，低工资和失业工人的失业现象变得持续存在，这似乎是完全由企业异质性造成的“失业疤痕”模式。在工资分布较高的地方，工人可以通过减薪来获得更稳定的就业机会。
Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.