Fully distributed identity-based threshold signatures with identifiable aborts
Fully distributed identity-based threshold signatures with identifiable aborts
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DOI:
10.1007/s11704-022-2370-4
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发表时间:
2023-02
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Yan Jiang;Youwen Zhu;Jian Wang;Xingxin Li
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yan Jiang;Youwen Zhu;Jian Wang;Xingxin Li
Identity-based threshold signature (IDTS) is a forceful primitive to protect identity and data privacy, in which parties can collaboratively sign a given message as a signer without reconstructing a signing key. Nevertheless, most IDTS schemes rely on a trusted key generation center (KGC). Recently, some IDTS schemes can achieve escrow-free security against corrupted KGC, but all of them are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks in the dishonest majority setting, where cheaters may force the protocol to abort without providing any feedback. In this work, we present a fully decentralized IDTS scheme to resist corrupted KGC and denial-of-service attacks. To this end, we design threshold protocols to achieve distributed key generation, private key extraction, and signing generation which can withstand the collusion between KGCs and signers, and then we propose an identification mechanism that can detect the identity of cheaters during key generation, private key extraction and signing generation. Finally, we formally prove that the proposed scheme is threshold unforgeability against chosen message attacks. The experimental results show that the computation time of both key generation and signing generation is <1 s, and private key extraction is about 3 s, which is practical in the distributed environment.