Bentham’s Contextualism and Its Relation to Analytic Philosophy
Bentham’s Contextualism and Its Relation to Analytic Philosophy
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边沁的情境主义及其与分析哲学的关系
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Silver Bronzo
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作者：
Silver Bronzo
本文（i）对边沁语言哲学的一些核心问题进行了阐释，（ii）对边沁语言哲学与分析哲学的关系的公认观点提出了挑战，（iii）试图表明，对分析哲学史前史的研究有助于揭示其历史本身。它经常被认为是，特别是奎因，边沁预期弗雷格的上下文原则和使用的上下文定义。在这些基础上，边沁被认为是一种传统的发起者之一，这种传统共同致力于“句子的语义优先性”，包括弗雷格、罗素和维特根斯坦等不同的作者。与此相反，我认为边沁确实预见到语境定义的使用，但不是弗雷格语境原则的先驱。这两个问题应严格区分。我表明，边沁的语言哲学是由一组的假设，弗雷格的语境主义是集中的意思是反对musicist。我的结论是，关于命题意义和次命题意义之间的关系问题，我们应该区分分析哲学史上两种对立的流派：一种是边沁所预见的、以罗素为代表的哲学流派，另一种是以弗雷格和维特根斯坦为代表的反哲学流派。
This paper (i) offers an interpretation of some central aspects of Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy of language, (ii) challenges the received view of its relation to analytic philosophy, and (iii) seeks to show that this investigation into the prehistory of analytic philosophy sheds light on its history proper. It has been often maintained, most notably by Quine, that Bentham anticipated Frege’s context principle and the use of contextual definition. On these bases, Bentham has been presented as one of the initiators of a tradition that shares a common commitment to the “semantic priority of sentences” and that includes authors as otherwise diverse as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. In opposition to this narrative, I argue that Bentham did indeed anticipate the use of contextual definition, but was not a forerunner of Frege’s context principle. The two issues should be sharply distinguished. I show that Bentham’s philosophy of language is informed by a set of empiricist assumptions that Frege’s contextualism was centrally meant to oppose. I conclude that with respect to the question of the relation between propositional and sub-propositional meaning, we should distinguish two opposed strands in the history of analytic philosophy: an empiricist strand anticipated by Bentham, represented most notably by Russell, and an anti-empiricist strand, represented most notably by Frege and Wittgenstein.