Mixed public‐private benefit and public‐good supply with application to the NATO alliance
Mixed public‐private benefit and public‐good supply with application to the NATO alliance
复制标题
混合公私利益和公共物品供给及其在北约联盟中的应用
DOI：
10.1080/10430719008404648
复制
发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
M. McGuire
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. McGuire
本文从需求方和供给方两个方面考察了利益防卫不纯问题。特别是，盟国之间防务利益的不完全可替代性和盟国之间不平等的成本优势被纳入公共物品提供模型。对收益或成本方面的部分可替代性进行了建模。这些替代方案强调了防务溢出效应的排放国和吸收国之间的关键区别。理论结果与北约联盟中盟国的行为有关。此外，本文还推导出简化形式的方程，使计量经济学估计能够区分可替代性的程度和潜在的分配过程，即纳什-古诺过程或林达尔过程。
This paper examines the issue of defence impurity of benefits on both the demand and supply side. In particular, imperfect substitutability of defence benefits between allies and unequal cost advantages between allies are incorporated into models of public‐good provision. Alternative versions of partial substitutability on either the benefit or cost side are modeled. These alternatives emphasize a crucial distinction between emitters and absorbers of defence spillovers. Theoretical results are related to the behavior of allies in the NATO alliance. In addition, the paper derives reduced‐form equations that would enable econometric estimates to distinguish the degree of substitutability and the underlying allocative process ‐ i.e., Nash‐Cournot or Lindahl processes.