A transcendental argument for the concept of personhood in neuroscience.
A transcendental argument for the concept of personhood in neuroscience.
复制标题
对神经科学中人格概念的先验论证。
DOI：
10.1080/15265160601064355
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sagoff,Mark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sagoff,Mark
Farah和Heberlein观察到，人格的概念“并不对应于世界上任何真正的物体类别”(2007，37)。换句话说，人格并不是指一种自然的人格。这些作者认为，由于我们不能将人格与自然界中发现的“本质特征”联系在一起，我们可以推断“人格是虚幻的，由我们的大脑构建，并投射到世界上”(2007，37)。他们争辩说，如果人格的概念有任何依据，那就必须在“一种通过基因预先编程的大脑系统中寻找，它代表着人与世界上其他类型的物体不同”(2007，37)。最近关于冥王星地位的争论表明，概念行星同样没有提到具有本质特征的自然类型。科学家们投射并经常对诸如PLANET这样的概念性概念进行辩论，以在调查规则(如智力诚实、诉诸证据而不是武力等)下以有用的方式组织现象。他们的所作所为是合法的。因此，我们会说这个概念行星是虚幻的吗？我们会不会试图把这个概念建立在一个大脑系统的基础上，这个大脑系统从基因上预先编程，将行星与其他类型的物体区分开来？正如Churchland(2007)在她的评论中所观察到的那样，山、宠物、蔬菜和疾病等概念并不是指自然物种。我们不是根据自然界的本质或定义特征来构建和投射这些概念，而是根据有助于我们彼此交流、理解经验和过上更好生活的惯例和做法。在开放和诚实的探究的压力下，科学上根深蒂固的隐喻让位于新的隐喻。像疾病这样的概念是有争议的，但它不是虚幻的。问题不是概念人是否指的是一种自然的人--自然的概念可能是虚幻的，也可能是无用的和令人困惑的--而是它是否在组织经验、帮助我们改善生活以及让我们彼此和平共处方面做了有价值的工作。一个不同的问题--Farah和Heberlein(2007)巧妙地考虑的一个问题--是大脑的基因预编程是否使人格的概念在发挥其有用功能方面领先一步。
Farah and Heberlein observe that the concept of personhood “does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world”(2007, 37). In other words, personhood does not refer to a natural kind. Because we cannot identify personhood with “essential characteristics” found in nature, these authors argue, we may infer that “personhood is illusory, constructed by our brains and projected onto the world”(2007, 37). If the notion of personhood has any basis, they argue, it must be sought in “a brain system genetically preprogrammed to represent persons as distinct from other kinds of objects in the world”(2007, 37). The recent controversy over the status of Pluto shows that the concept planet likewise fails to refer to a natural kind with essential characteristics. Scientists project and often contest conceptual constructs such as planet to organize phenomena in useful ways under rules of inquiry (such as intellectual honesty, appeal to evidence rather than force, etc.) that make what they do legitimate. Would we say that the concept planet is therefore illusory? Would we try to base this concept in a brain system genetically preprogrammed to represent planets as distinct from other kinds of objects?As Churchland (2007) observes in her commentary, concepts such as mountain, pet, vegetable, and disease fail to refer to natural kinds. We construct and project these concepts not in view of essential or defining characteristics in the natural world but according to conventions and practices that help us communicate with one another, make sense of experience, and live better lives. The metaphors a science entrenches as literal give way to new metaphors under the pressure of open and honest inquiry. A concept such as disease is contested but it is not illusory. The question is not whether the concept person refers to a natural kind—the concept natural kind may be illusory as well as useless and confusing—but whether it does valuable work in organizing experience, helping us to improve our lives, and allowing us to live peacefully with one another. A different question—one which Farah and Heberlein (2007) ably consider—is whether the genetic preprogramming of the brain gives the concept of personhood a head start in serving its useful functions.