Price Competition in Multimarket Duopolies
Price Competition in Multimarket Duopolies
复制标题
多市场双头垄断中的价格竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Matutes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Lal;C. Matutes
在这篇文章中，我们分析了在一个完全信息静态的框架下，企业对各种商品的需求竞争的定价策略。特别是，我们在一个由两种类型的消费者组成的市场中建立了两个对称企业之间的竞争模型，每一种消费者可能购买两家企业销售的一单位商品。我们证明了所有纳什均衡都是这样的，没有一家公司对两种商品收取相同的价格。有趣的是，在某些条件下，两类消费者之间的共同价格差别甚至可能达到相同的利润水平，就好像它们最大化了共同利润一样；对于另一组条件，唯一均衡是其中一种商品的价格和捆绑商品的价格与只有一种商品的标准霍特林模型中的商品价格相同。最后，我们证明，如果这些均衡存在，两家公司都倾向于销售两种商品，而不是专门从事其中任何一种商品。正如本文所建模的那样，这些结果是多市场竞争和多个细分市场存在之间相互作用的直接结果。
In this article, we analyze the pricing strategies of firms that compete for the demand of an assortment of goods in a complete information static framework. In particular, we model the competition between two symmetric firms in a market that consists of two types of consumers, each of which may buy one unit of both goods sold by the two firms. We show that all Nash equilibria are such that neither firm charges the same price for both goods. Interestingly, under certain conditions, the firms jointly price discriminate between the two types of consumers and may even achieve the same level of profits as if they maximized joint profits; for another set of conditions, the unique equilibrium is such that the price for one of the goods and the price for the bundle are the same as the price of the good in a standard Hotelling model with one good. Finally, we show that if these equilibria exist, both firms prefer to sell both goods rather than specialize in either one of them. These results are a direct consequence of the interplay between the multimarket rivalry and the existence of more than one market segment, as modelled in this article.