When formal finance meets the informal: the case of Wenzhou
When formal finance meets the informal: the case of Wenzhou
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DOI：
10.1057/s41261-020-00139-9
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发表时间：
2019-05
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Ding Chen;S. Deakin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ding Chen;S. Deakin
我们研究了2011年中国温州金融危机的原因。2011年的金融危机被归咎于非正规金融体系的弱点，包括掠夺性利率，但我们认为，失败的根源在于2008年全球金融危机后，正规和非正规金融体系交织在一起，以及中国当局为应对危机而采取的扩张性货币政策。我们探讨了这一时期正规信贷供应过剩的影响，以及鼓励集体贷款的影响，这是一种在2008年之前相对未知的做法，它放大了危机的影响。我们认为，从温州吸取的教训并不是非正规金融本质上比正规金融更不稳定或效率更低，而是正规金融和非正规金融之间的冲突可能引发两者的不稳定。
We examine the causes of the financial crisis of 2011 in the Chinese city of Wenzhou. While the crisis of 2011 has been attributed to weaknesses in the system of informal finance, including predatory interest rates, we suggest that the roots of the failure lay in the way that the formal and informal systems became intertwined in the period following the global financial crisis of 2008 and the expansionary monetary policy initiated by the Chinese authorities to counter its effects. We explore the effects of the over-supply of formal credit in this period and the encouragement of group lending, a practice relatively unknown prior to 2008, and which magnified the effects of the crisis. We suggest that the lesson to draw from Wenzhou is not that informal finance is inherently more instable or inefficient than formal finance, but that encounters between formal and informal finance can trigger instabilities in both.