Regional integration and lobbying for tariffs against nonmembers
Regional integration and lobbying for tariffs against nonmembers
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-2354.00032
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发表时间：
1999-08-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Olarreaga, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cadot, O;de Melo, J;Olarreaga, M
我们在三好、三个国家的政治经济模型中研究了区域贸易安排（RIA）对非成员国关税政策的影响。通过比较具有和不具有原产地规则的自由贸易区（FTA）以及经济和政治一体化程度不同的关税同盟（CU），我们展示了日益深入的一体化如何导致针对非成员进口的保护不断加强。自由贸易协定和关税同盟之间的其他差异，例如关税同盟搭便车的程度以及旨在改善成员贸易条件的关税同盟的任何组成部分，都没有明确说明。尽管如此，结果表明自由贸易协定可能会在福利方面主导CU。
We study the impact of regional trading arrangements (RIAs) on tariff policy toward nonmembers in a three-good, three-country political economy model. Comparing free-trade areas (FTAs) with and without rules of origin and customs unions (CUs) with varying degrees of economic and political integration, we show how increasingly deep integration can lead to rising protection against nonmember imports. Other differences between FTAs and CUs, like the extent of free-riding in a CU and any component of a CU's tariff designed to improve the members' terms of trade, are not explicitly accounted for. Nevertheless, the results suggest that FTAs are likely to welfare dominate CUs.