Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure
Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1104444
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发表时间：
2008-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nittai K. Bergman;Sugata Roychowdhury
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文献类型：
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作者：
Nittai K. Bergman;Sugata Roychowdhury
摘要本文研究了企业如何通过信息披露政策对投资者情绪做出战略性反应，试图影响情绪引起的预期偏差。通过使用密歇根消费者信心指数来代表情绪，我们发现，在情绪低迷的时期，经理们会提高预测，“走高”当前对未来长期收益的估计。相比之下，在情绪高涨期间，经理们会减少他们的长期预测活动。此外，尽管情绪与分析师对未来收益估计的偏差之间存在关联，但即使在控制了分析师的悲观情绪后，管理层披露的信息也会因情绪而异，这表明经理人试图与广大投资者沟通，而不仅仅是分析师。我们的研究提供了证据，表明公司的长期披露选择反映了管理者保持乐观收益估值的愿望。版权所有(C)，芝加哥大学代表专业会计学会，2008年。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biases in expectations. Proxying for sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, we show that during low-sentiment periods, managers increase forecasts to "walk up" current estimates of future earnings over long horizons. In contrast, during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long-horizon forecasting activity. Further, while there is an association between sentiment and the biases in analysts' estimates of future earnings, management disclosures vary with sentiment even after controlling for analyst pessimism, indicating that managers attempt to communicate with investors at large, and not just analysts. Our study provides evidence that firms' long-horizon disclosure choices reflect managers' desire to maintain optimistic earnings valuations. Copyright (c), University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008.