Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round ARIA and Camellia
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round ARIA and Camellia
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DOI：
10.1007/s11390-007-9056-0
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发表时间：
2007-05
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Wenling Wu;Wentao Zhang;D. Feng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wenling Wu;Wentao Zhang;D. Feng
本文研究了分组密码ARIA和Camellia的抗不可能差分分析的安全性。我们的工作提高了最好的不可能的差分密码分析ARIA和茶花已知的。ARIA的设计者期望4轮ARIA不存在不可能的差异。然而，我们发现了一些非平凡的4轮不可能差分，这可能导致对6轮ARIA的可能攻击。此外，我们发现了一些非平凡的8轮不可能微分的山茶花，而只有7轮不可能微分是以前已知的。利用8轮不可能差分，提出了一种对12轮Camellia的无FL/FL 1层攻击.
This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia withoutFL/FL1layers.