STRAWSON ON REFERRING
STRAWSON ON REFERRING
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斯特劳森谈推荐
DOI：
10.1093/mind/lxviii.272.539
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发表时间：
1959
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Charles E. Caton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Charles E. Caton
这是Strawson的术语，指的是“在.“（第246页）。可以这样使用的表达方式包括：单数指示代词，专有名词，单数人称代词和非人称代词，明确的描述。斯特劳森区分了所使用的表达和对它们的使用。它是使用，而不是表达，这是“独特的指。“因此，一个明确的描述并没有什么内在的东西使它具有唯一性。（对比“鲸鱼是哺乳动物“和“鲸鱼撞上了船”。”）事实上，斯特劳森走得更远。表达式根本不指！这不是一个表达，而是它的使用（由一些人），这是指。斯特劳森区分了（他认为罗素没有区分）一个句子（或一个表达式）、这个句子（或表达式）的使用和这个句子（或表达式）的表达。同一个句子可以用在不同的场合，做出具有不同真值的不同陈述。斯特劳森所说的“句子”是指“句子类型”，他所说的“句子的使用”是指“句子标记”，正如他在第250页的讨论所表明的那样。斯特劳森认为罗素忽略了这一区别（“他混淆了表达和它们在特定语境中的使用“，第250页）。对于一个模糊这种区别的人来说，似乎是同一件事（即一个句子）既有意义又是真的（或假的）。但斯特劳森认为，有意义的是句子类型，但它在特定场合的使用（即，一个记号）是真的还是假的。因此，斯特劳森坚持认为罗素句子（“法国国王是秃头“）是有意义的，但它的任何表征（至少是最近200年产生的任何表征）既不是真的也不是假的。
This is Strawson's term for the use of an expression to " mention or refer to some individual person or single object … in the course of … making a statement about that person [or] object …. " (p. 246). Expressions that can be used this way include: singular demonstrative pronouns, proper names, singular personal and impersonal pronouns, definite descriptions. Strawson distinguishes between the expressions used and the uses made of them. It is the use, not the expression, that is " uniquely referring. " Thus, there is nothing inherent to a definite description that makes it refer uniquely. (Contrast " the whale is a mammal " with " the whale struck the ship. ") In fact, Strawson goes further. Expressions do not refer at all! It is not an expression but its use (by some person) that refers. Strawson distinguishes (as he thinks Russell did not) between a sentence (or an expression), a use of that sentence (or expression), and an utterance of that sentence (or expression). One and the same sentence can be used on different occasions, to make different statements with different truth-values. What Strawson means by 'sentence' is 'sentence-type', and what he means by 'use of a sentence' is 'sentence-token', as his discussion on p. 250 makes clear. Strawson thinks Russell overlooked this distinction (" he confused expressions with their use in a particular context " p. 250). To one who blurs this distinction, it would appear that it is the same thing (namely, a sentence) that is both meaningful and true (or false). But Strawson holds that it is the sentence type that is meaningful, but its use on a particular occasion (i.e., a token) that is true or false. Hence, Strawson maintains that the Russell sentence (" The king of France is bald ") is meaningful, but that any token of it (at least, any token produced in the last 200 years) will be neither true nor false.