Gender ratio, divorce rate, and intra-household collective decision process: evidence from iranian urban households labor supply with non-participation
Gender ratio, divorce rate, and intra-household collective decision process: evidence from iranian urban households labor supply with non-participation
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性别比、离婚率与家庭内部集体决策过程：来自伊朗城市家庭不参与劳动力供给的证据
DOI：
10.1007/s00181-014-0828-4
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Gholamreza Keshavarz Haddad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gholamreza Keshavarz Haddad
本文在家庭内部集体决策的框架下，对伊朗配偶的个体劳动力供给进行了实证研究，其中性别比例和离婚率在家庭资源配置中起着核心作用。数据集取自家庭支出调查（2008年）和伊朗年度统计年鉴（2008年）。我已经进行了参数估计和假设检验，使用切换回归技术，以捕捉伊朗家庭中普遍存在的配偶不参与。考虑工资率的内禀性，估计了劳动供给的减少形式。研究结果表明，伊朗民事诉讼规则下的单一资源配置模式和集体决策模式遭到强烈反对，但家庭资源配置的帕累托效率和特定模式的有效性得到了肯定。此外，劳动供给缩减形式的一致性条件也得到了满足。结构性劳动供给来源于缩减形式，表明闲暇对配偶而言是一种正常的商品。他们还表明，妻子的劳动力供给相对于丈夫的工资的交叉弹性是负的。计算出的非劳动收入对妻子份额的边际效应为0.76。性别比例和离婚率是决定共享规则的重要因素，这些变量的估计系数与理论考虑是一致的。
This paper provides an empirical investigation on the individual labor supply of Iranian spouses in an intra-household collective decision framework in which gender ratio and divorce rate play a central role for resource allocation of household. The dataset is taken from the Households’ Expenditures Survey (2008) and the Annual Statistical Yearbook (2008) of Iran. I have conducted the parameters estimation and hypothesis testing using switching regression technique to catch the presence of the widespread non-participation of spouses across Iranian households. Reduced forms of labor supply are estimated considering the endogeneity of wage rates. The findings show that the unitary model of resource allocation and the collective model of decision process under Iranian civil procedure rules are strongly rejected, but the Pareto efficiency in the family resource allocation and validity of the specified model are confirmed. Furthermore, the coherency condition of labor supply reduced forms is satisfied. The structural labor supplies are derived from the reduced forms, and they indicate that leisure is a normal good for spouses. They also show the cross elasticity of a wife’s labor supply with respect to her husband’s wage is negative. The calculated marginal effect of non-labor income on the wife’s share is 0.76. The gender ratio and the divorce rate are both significant determinants of the sharing rule and the estimated coefficients of these variables are consistent with theoretical considerations.