Equilibrium Bank Runs
Equilibrium Bank Runs
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DOI：
10.1086/344803
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发表时间：
2003-02
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
J. Peck;Karl Shell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Peck;Karl Shell
我们分析了一个银行系统，其中可行的存款合同，或机制，是广泛的。这些机制必须满足连续服务约束，但允许部分或全部暂停兑换。消费者必须事先愿意存款。我们通过例子表明，在所谓的“最优契约”下，存款后博弈可以有一个运行均衡。给定一个由太阳黑子触发的挤兑倾向，完整预存博弈的最优合约可以与正概率发生的挤兑一致。因此，Diamond-Dybvig框架可以解释银行挤兑是在最优存款契约下的均衡中出现的。
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broad. The mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint, but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed. Consumers must be willing to deposit, ex ante. We show, by examples, that under the so‐called “optimal contract,” the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium. Given a propensity to run, triggered by sunspots, the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability. Thus the Diamond‐Dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract.