Automata, Languages, and Programming
Automata, Languages, and Programming
复制标题
自动机、语言和编程
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-39212-2_44
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christodoulou G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christodoulou G
在过去的十年中，拥塞博弈中的无政府状态价格（PoA）吸引了大量的研究。这导致了对这一概念的透彻理解。相比之下，价格的稳定性（PoS），这是一个同样有趣的概念，是少得多understanded.In这篇文章中，我们考虑的拥塞游戏多项式成本函数的非负系数和最大度。我们在这样的游戏中给出了PoS的匹配边界，也就是说，我们的技术提供了任何度的精确值。对于线性拥塞游戏，紧边界是以前已知的。这些界限甚至适用于更严格的支配均衡的情况，而支配均衡可能并不存在。我们给出了一个分离的结果表明，这是不可能的拥塞游戏与二次成本函数，换句话说，PoA的子类的游戏，承认一个占主导地位的战略均衡是严格小于PoS的一般类。
The price of anarchy (PoA) in congestion games has attracted a lot of research over the past decade. This has resulted in a thorough understanding of this concept. In contrast, the price of stability (PoS), which is an equally interesting concept, is much less understood.In this article, we consider congestion games with polynomial cost functions with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degreed. We give matching bounds for the PoS in such games—that is, our technique provides the exact value for any degreed.For linear congestion games, tight bounds were previously known. Those bounds hold even for the more restricted case of dominant equilibria, which may not exist. We give a separation result showing that this is not possible for congestion games with quadratic cost functions—in other words, the PoA for the subclass of games that admit a dominant strategy equilibrium is strictly smaller than the PoS for the general class.