Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action
Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action
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DOI：
10.1093/mind/fzn050
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发表时间：
2008-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Rietveld, Erik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rietveld, Erik
在日常生活中，我们常常做得很充分，但却没有深思熟虑。例如，我们立即获得并保持与电梯内其他人的适当距离。这里隐含的规范性概念是一个非常基本的概念，即在特定情况下区分适当与不充分、正确与不正确、或更好与更差。在本文的第一部分，我通过关注非反思性的专家行为来研究这种“情境规范性”。更具体地说，我用维特根斯坦的工匠(裁缝和建筑师)全神贯注于行动的例子来介绍情境规范性。情境规范性可以理解为不反思的巧妙行为中的具身认知的规范方面。我发展了维特根斯坦的洞察力，即一种特殊的情感行为--“直接不满”--对于不经过反思就能把事情做好是必不可少的。定向不满是一种在行动中欣赏的反应，并被引入为情境规范性的典范表达。在第二部分中，我讨论了维特根斯坦关于他所说的“盲目”遵守规则和立即行动的“基石”的规范性的思想。要理解遵守规则的规范性(即使是“盲目的”)，重要的不是一个人是否有语言表达或反思的能力，而是一个人是否可靠地参与了一个公共习俗。在第三部分中，我进一步考察了非反思性技巧动作、知觉、情绪和规范性之间的复杂关系。其中一部分需要说明专家社会文化实践层面的规范性与个人所处和生活的规范性之间的联系。
In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such 'situated normativity' by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein's examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein's insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, 'directed discontent', is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein's ideas on the normativity of what he calls 'blind' rule-following and the 'bedrock' of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even 'blind') rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity.