Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
复制标题
幻觉论和现象意识的定义
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-020-01418-x
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Takuya Niikawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Niikawa Takuya;Miyahara Katsunori;Hamada Hiro Taiyo;Nishida Satoshi;新田智通;Niikawa Takuya;杉浦茜・樋口浩造;Takuya Niikawa
本文旨在揭示幻觉主义和反幻觉主义之间关于现象意识的根本分歧所在。虽然幻觉主义者声称现象意识不存在，但许多心灵哲学家认为幻觉主义是荒谬的，认为现象意识的存在不能合理怀疑。问题是，为什么会出现如此激烈的分歧呢？为了解决这个问题，我列出了“现象意识”一词的各种特征：（1）“它是什么”的措辞，（2）内在指称，（3）思想实验，如哲学僵尸、倒置感受性和玛丽的房间，（4）关于次要属性的科学知识，（5）理论属性，如不可言喻和内在的，以及（6）表象/现实崩溃。然后，我检查每个特征是否提供了（i）现象意识的可疑意义，其中现象意识的存在可以被合理怀疑，（ii）不容怀疑的意义，其存在不能被合理怀疑，或（iii）灰色意义，其中其存在是否可以被合理怀疑是有争议的。通过这样做，我表明，对于现象意识的单一意义，幻觉主义者和反幻觉主义者对于是否可以合理地怀疑现象意识的存在存在分歧。我的结论是，幻觉主义者和反幻觉主义者之间的分歧从根本上来说是术语上的：幻觉主义者采用了一种值得怀疑的现象意识，而反幻觉主义者则采用了一种不容置疑的现象意识。由于“现象意识”一词的极端模糊性和模糊性，幻觉主义者和反幻觉主义者看不到他们谈论的是不同意义上的现象意识。
This paper aims to uncover where the disagreement between illusionism and anti-illusionism about phenomenal consciousness lies fundamentally. While illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, many philosophers of mind regard illusionism as ridiculous, stating that the existence of phenomenal consciousness cannot be reasonably doubted. The question is, why does such a radical disagreement occur? To address this question, I list various characterisations of the term “phenomenal consciousness”: (1) the what-it-is-like locution, (2) inner ostension, (3) thought experiments such as philosophical zombies, inverted qualia and Mary’s room, (4) scientific knowledge about secondary properties, (5) theoretical properties such as being ineffable and being intrinsic, and (6) appearance/reality collapse. Then I examine whether each characterization provides (i) a dubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness in which the existence of phenomenal consciousness can be reasonably doubted, (ii) an indubitable sense in which its existence cannot be reasonably doubted, or (iii) a gray sense in which it is controversial whether its existence can be reasonably doubted. By doing so, I show that there is no single sense of phenomenal consciousness in which illusionists and anti-illusionists disagree whether the existence of phenomenal consciousness can be reasonably doubted. I conclude that the disagreement between illusionists and anti-illusionists is fundamentally terminological: while illusionists adopt a dubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness, anti-illusionists adopt an indubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness. Because of the extreme vagueness and ambiguity of the term “phenomenal consciousness”, illusionists and anti-illusionists fail to see that they talk about different senses of phenomenal consciousness.