The Social Sources of Financial Power: Domestic Legitimacy and International Financial Orders
The Social Sources of Financial Power: Domestic Legitimacy and International Financial Orders
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金融权力的社会根源：国内合法性与国际金融秩序
DOI：
10.1111/j.1944-8287.2008.tb00397.x
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Leonard Seabrooke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Leonard Seabrooke
84（1）：117-118.© 2008克拉克大学。www.经济地理学联合国金融体系将失去合法性，从而削弱你在国际金融舞台上的影响力。不过，我不知道这个机制在现实中是否有效。首先，全球化使国内和国际金融实力之间的联系日益复杂化。以新加坡、都柏林和卢森堡等国际金融中心为例，它们都不是从深厚或广泛的国内资本池中成长起来的。考虑到试图增加来自伦敦的国际金融公司和专业人员的税收，引发他们将迁往其他地方的威胁，从而破坏联合王国的国际金融能力。其次，西布鲁克对风险保持沉默，而风险是金融领域的一个关键变量。当国家积极干预并将LIGs与国际金融市场联系起来时，例如通过证券化，LIGs面临新的风险。因此，国家、低收入国家和食利者之间的斗争不仅会导致积极或消极的改革，而且会给社会带来不同的风险收益组合。第三，人们，包括低收入国家，都是通过自己的方式与国际经济互动，而不仅仅是通过国家。全球化，包括国际移徙和避税地等现象，沿着风险意识和不确定性，影响到个人的信念和信念驱动的行动。另一个批评涉及社会进步的金融改革和不平等之间的关系。尽管西布鲁克描述了一段有利于低收入国家的积极国家干预时期，但1985年至2000年期间美国的收入不平等扩大了。西布鲁克试图将金融改革问题与不平等分开，但我很难将反食利的金融改革与日益加剧的不平等相协调。低收入国家如何才能在获得更好的金融改革协议的同时，仍然变得相对更穷？金融改革是否未能解决不平等问题？影响不平等的其他力量是否压倒了金融改革的积极影响？遗憾的是，Seabrooke避免解决甚至提出这些问题作为进一步研究的建议。还有其他相关的经验问题没有提到西布鲁克。在1985年至2000年的消极国家干预时期，日本的不平等发生了什么？作为社会市场经济的一部分，德国在二战后经历了积极的金融改革吗？最后，我感到失望的是，西布鲁克只在美国案例研究的背景下提到养老金制度，尽管它们是任何金融改革关系的关键部分，也是低收入国家利益的核心。毕竟，养恤基金与其他机构投资者，如共同基金和保险基金，是主要的国际金融行为者。普通人对政府治理的影响是财政权力的另一个潜在的社会来源。尽管我对西布鲁克的论点的力量持怀疑态度，但这是一部清晰的最先进的批判性社会科学作品，具有令人印象深刻的经验范围和理论深度。该分析用有用的图表进行了说明，这些图表描绘了四个分析国家私人持有金融资产结构的演变。这本书中有争议的论点有助于增强它的吸引力。在学术界，西布鲁克的工作应该是有价值的，不仅为研究人员，但也作为一个二级阅读的高级本科生和研究生。
84 (1): 117–118.© 2008 Clark University.—www. economicgeography. org financial system will lose legitimacy, thus undermining your influence on the international financial scene. I am not sure, however, whether this mechanism works in reality. First, globalization increasingly complicates the link between domestic and international financial power. Consider the international financial centers of Singapore, Dublin, and Luxembourg, none of which has grown out of a deep or broad domestic pool of capital. Consider attempts to increase tax revenues from international financial firms and professionals in London, triggering the threat that they will move elsewhere, thus undermining the international financial capacity of the United Kingdom. Second, Seabrooke is silent on risk, a crucial variable in finance. When states intervene positively and link LIGs with international financial markets, for example, through securitization, LIGs are exposed to new risks. Thus, the struggle among state, LIGs, and rentiers results not only in positive or negative reform, but also in different risk-return combinations for the society. Third, people, including LIGs, interact with the international economy on their own, not just through the state. Globalization, including such phenomena as international migration and tax havens, along with risk perception and uncertainty, affect beliefs and belief-driven actions of individuals. Another criticism involves the relationship between socially progressive financial reform and inequality. In spite of what Seabrooke describes as a period of positive state intervention in favor of LIGs, income inequality in the United States between 1985 and 2000 widened. Seabrooke tries to separate the issue of financial reform from inequality, but I struggle to reconcile an antirentier financial reform with growing inequality. How can LIGs get a better financial reform deal and still get relatively poorer? Does financial reform fail to address the problem of inequality? Do other forces affecting inequality overwhelm the positive effects of financial reform? It is a pity that Seabrooke avoids addressing or even posing these questions as suggestions for further research. There are other related empirical questions not mentioned by Seabrooke. What happened to inequality in Japan in the period of negative state intervention from 1985 to 2000? Did Germany experience positive financial reform after World War II as part of its social market economy? Finally, I was disappointed that Seabrooke mentions pension systems only in the context of the US case study, although they are a crucial part of any financial reform nexus and are central to the interests of LIGs. After all, pension funds, together with other institutional investors, such as mutual and insurance funds, are key international financial actors. The impact of ordinary people on their governance is another potential social source of financial power.Notwithstanding my skepticism about the power of Seabrooke’s argument, this is a clearly written piece of state-of-the-art critical social science, with an impressive empirical scope and theoretical depth. The analysis is illustrated with useful graphs that depict the evolution of the structure of privately held financial assets in each of the four analyzed countries. The controversial arguments of the book serve to enhance its appeal. In academia, Seabrooke’s work should be valuable not only for researchers, but also as a secondary reading for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students.