Treatment of uncompensated cost of marine accidents in a model of welfare economics
Treatment of uncompensated cost of marine accidents in a model of welfare economics
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福利经济学模型下处理海上事故无偿成本
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kostas Giziakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Goulielmos;Kostas Giziakis
试图确定应强调船舶、货物和人员安全政策的主要经济原则。他们应用了福利经济学的一个模型，通过这个模型，他们建立了一个“可接受”或“最佳”的海上事故水平，在这个水平上，防止海上事故的边际成本等于减少海上事故的边际成本。他们主要使用图形分析来检验《石油污染法》是否是一项方向正确的政策措施。海事组织的《国际安全守则》也有类似的见解，该守则试图通过减少海上事故（和防止污染）来建立航运质量。据作者所知，这是第一次应用。
Attempts to determine the main economic principles that should underline the policies towards safety of ships, cargoes and persons. They applied a model from welfare economics through which they established an “acceptable” or “optimum” level of marine accidents at a point where marginal cost of preventing marine accidents equals the marginal costs of fewer marine accidents. Using mainly graphical analysis they tested whether the Oil Pollution Act is a policy measure in the right direction or not. Similar insights were made for the International Safety Code of IMO which tries to establish quality in shipping through reducing marine accidents (and preventing pollution). This application, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, was performed for the first time.