Electoral Manipulation in Polarized Societies
Electoral Manipulation in Polarized Societies
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两极分化社会中的选举操纵
作者：
Carlo M. Horz
我使用选举操纵模型来研究民主可行性和两极分化之间的关系，并重点关注寻求政策的现任者和反对派之间的战略互动。我发现两极分化对于现任者利用选举操纵的影响是模糊的。我将该模型应用于几个具体的政治进程，并表明在这些附加假设下，操纵与极化之间的关系呈反 U 形：操纵在低水平极化时较低，在极化处于中等水平时达到峰值，并在极化变得极端时再次下降。我证明了这种关系对于多种扩展都是稳健的。最后，我研究了共同的民主保障——法院——的存在如何影响两极分化和操纵之间的关系。我发现法院只有在意识形态上与反对派保持一致且两极分化程度较低时才会限制操纵行为。
I examine the relationship between democratic viability and polarization using a model of electoral manipulation and focusing on the strategic interaction between a policy-seeking incumbent and opposition. I find that polarization has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s use of electoral manipulation. I apply the model to several concrete political processes and show that under these additional assumptions, the relationship between manipulation and polarization is inversely U-shaped: manipulation is low at low levels of polarization, peaks when polarization is intermediate, and decreases again as polarization becomes extreme. I show that this relationship is robust to several extensions. Finally, I investigate how the presence of a common democratic safeguard—a court—affects the relationship between polarization and manipulation. I find that the court constrains manipulation only if it is ideologically aligned with the opposition and polarization is low.