Quantum oblivious transfer is secure against all individual measurements
Quantum oblivious transfer is secure against all individual measurements
复制标题
量子不经意传输对于所有单独测量都是安全的
DOI：
10.1109/phycmp.1994.363696
复制
发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Montrkal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Mayers;UniversitC de Montrkal;Montrkal
证明了BBCS协议(Bennett，Brassard，CRE/SPL急性/PEAU和SkuBiszewska，Crypto‘91,1992)实现了最重要的密码原语之一--“不经意转移”--对于量子力学允许的任何单独测量是安全的。我们分析了在协议中对同一光子的连续测量可能被用来作弊的常见情况。我们通过使用单个内积保持(IPP)算子，然后是完整的复合结果冯·诺伊曼测量来模拟这种情况。然后，在假设只能执行单个测量的情况下，获得了剩余碰撞熵的下界。这个界限用于应用隐私放大技术，以得出BBCS协议的安全性。
Shows that the BBCS-protocol (Bennett, Brassard, Cre/spl acute/peau and Skubiszewska, CRYPTO'91, 1992) implementing one of the most important cryptographic primitives-'oblivious transfer'-is secure against any individual measurement allowed by quantum mechanics. We analyze the common situation where successive measurements on the same photon could be used to cheat in the protocol. We model this situation by using a single inner-product-preserving (IPP) operator, followed by a complete composite-outcome Von Neumann measurement. A lower bound on the residual collision entropy is then obtained under the assumption that only individual measurements can be performed. This bound is used to apply privacy amplification techniques in order to conclude the security of the BBCS-protocol.<<ETX>>