Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law
Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law
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法律中的情感与情感主义
DOI:
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发表时间:
1999
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Posner
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
R. Posner
Much of the behavior that law regulates is emotional—think of the murder of an adulterous spouse, the kidnapping of a child by a parent denied custody, or the daubing of paint on a fur coat by an animal-rights activist. Or it is shockingly devoid of emotion (the “cold-blooded” murder). Or it arouses the emotions—often sympathy for the victim of a crime or a tort and indignation at the injurer, but sometimes sympathy for the injurer, as in killings by “battered wives”—of people who hear or read about the incident. The law itself is conventionally regarded as a bastion of “reason” conceived of as the antithesis of emotion, as operating to rein in the emotionality of the behavior that gives rise to legal disputes. The emotionality of acts that are regulated by the law, and the law’s emotional or nonemotional response to that emotionality raise a number of issues for the legal system. I address four. The first is how the fact that a wrongful act is precipitated by an emotion should affect the law’s evaluation of the act. Should emotionality make the law come down more or less hard on the violator? I discuss this question with particular reference to “hate crime” laws and to provocation as a mitigating factor in criminal punishment. The second question is whether and how the law should use emotion. The third is what the emotional state of the law’s administrators, whether judges, jurors, prosecutors, or police, should be. Should they be emotionless, like computers? If not, how precisely should emotion enter into their judgments? And fourth, what screens or filters first should be used to assure that the administrators are in the correct emotional state (whatever exactly that is) when carrying out their legal duties? Chapter Twelve