Election Control in Social Networks via Edge Addition or Removal
Election Control in Social Networks via Edge Addition or Removal
复制标题
通过添加或删除边缘来控制社交网络中的选举
DOI：
10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5556
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Gatti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matteo Castiglioni;Diodato Ferraioli;N. Gatti
我们专注于其中的消息赞成和/或反对一个或多个候选人的情况下，通过社交网络传播，以影响接收器的投票。当机械手可以通过购买影响器进行播种时，在文献中已知几个结果。在本文中，相反，我们假设一组影响者和他们的消息被给定，我们问一个操纵者（例如，平台）可以通过在社交网络中添加或移除边缘来改变选举的结果。我们研究了各种情况下区分候选人的数量或在网络上传播的消息的种类。我们提供了一个积极的结果，表明除了琐碎的情况外，操纵是负担不起的，即使操纵者的预算无限（即，他可以根据需要添加或移除任意多的边）。此外，我们证明了我们的硬度结果在重新优化变体中仍然成立，其中操纵器已经知道问题的最优解，并且一旦发生局部修改就需要计算新的解（例如，在与随机变量相关的估计随时间改变的强盗情形中）。
We focus on the scenario in which messages pro and/or against one or multiple candidates are spread through a social network in order to affect the votes of the receivers. Several results are known in the literature when the manipulator can make seeding by buying influencers. In this paper, instead, we assume the set of influencers and their messages to be given, and we ask whether a manipulator (e.g., the platform) can alter the outcome of the election by adding or removing edges in the social network. We study a wide range of cases distinguishing for the number of candidates or for the kind of messages spread over the network. We provide a positive result, showing that, except for trivial cases, manipulation is not affordable, the optimization problem being hard even if the manipulator has an unlimited budget (i.e., he can add or remove as many edges as desired). Furthermore, we prove that our hardness results still hold in a reoptimization variant, where the manipulator already knows an optimal solution to the problem and needs to compute a new solution once a local modification occurs (e.g., in bandit scenarios where estimations related to random variables change over time).
通过社会影响力控制选举
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
影响因子：
--
作者：
Wilder, Bryan;Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
通讯作者：
Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy