ON THE VERY IDEA OF CRITERIA FOR PERSONHOOD
ON THE VERY IDEA OF CRITERIA FOR PERSONHOOD
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DOI：
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00042.x
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发表时间：
2011-03-01
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Chappell, Timothy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chappell, Timothy
我考察了人们所熟悉的关于人格的标准观点，根据这一观点，拥有诸如自我意识、情感、知觉等个人属性对于一个人的地位来说是必要的和充分的。我认为，这种观点混淆了人格的标准与人格的理想的一部分。在正常情况下，在我们开始寻找一个生物来表现个人属性之前，我们已经把它识别为一个人，事实上，这种预先识别是使我们能够首先把生物看作和解释为一个人的一部分。这种预先识别通常基于生物特征。除了在一些有趣的特殊或科幻小说的情况下，其中一些我讨论，这是人类动物，我们确定为人。
P>I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons.