Rational terrorists and optimal network structure
Rational terrorists and optimal network structure
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DOI：
10.1177/0022002706296155
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发表时间：
2007-02-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Su, Xuejuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Enders, Walter;Su, Xuejuan
9/11事件后，美国的反恐变得更加积极主动，因为《爱国者法案》允许当局有更大的自由直接攻击恐怖分子的网络结构。我们认为，理性的恐怖分子将试图阻挠此类政策，并重组自身，使其难以被攻破。我们模拟了恐怖分子面临的安全与团体内部交流之间的权衡。该模型用于推导网络结构的预期变化，以及潜在恐怖袭击的类型、复杂性和成功率的变化。
After the events of 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism became more proactive in that the Patriot Act allowed the authorities far more freedom to directly attack terrorist network structures. We argue that rational terrorists will attempt to thwart such policies and restructure themselves to be less penetrable. We model the trade-off between security and intragroup communication faced by terrorists. The model is used to derive the anticipated changes in network structure and the consequent changes in the type, complexity, and success rate of potential terrorist attacks.