Tilburg University Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth ? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes
Tilburg University Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth ? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes
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蒂尔堡大学 公司控制和产品市场竞争会带来更强劲的生产力增长吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Renneboog
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jens Köke;L. Renneboog
本研究以德国和英国两个大样本企业为研究对象，考察了公司治理和产品市场竞争对全要素生产率增长的影响。在表现不佳的英国公司中，强大的外部大股东的存在导致生产率大幅提高。首先，对于德国业绩不佳和陷入困境的企业来说，银行债务集中刺激了生产率增长。虽然高银行债务集中度也支持德国盈利企业的生产率增长，但杠杆率与英国企业的生产率增长无关。在英国，产品市场竞争疲软对广泛持有的公司和集中的公司的生产率增长都有负面影响，但内部人（董事）控制的公司除外。这些似乎能够提高那些几乎不受市场约束的企业的生产率。对于盈利的德国公司来说，强大的大股东控制和生产率增长之间的关系是有限的。只有通过银行、保险公司和政府的控制，才能在一定程度上减少产品市场竞争乏力的负面影响。
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on total factor productivity growth for two large samples of German and UK firms. In poorly performing UK firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders lead to substantial increases in productivity. Contrarily, for German poorly performing and distressed firms, it is bank debt concentration which stimulates productivity growth. Whereas high bank debt concentration also supports productivity growth in German profitable firms, leverage is unrelated to productivity growth in UK firms. Weak product market competition in the UK has a negative impact on productivity growth of in both widely-held firms and concentrated firms with the exception of firms controlled insiders (directors). These seem able to generate productivity increases in firms subject to little market discipline. For profitable German firms, the relation between strong blockholder control and productivity growth is limited. Only control by banks, insurance firms and the government can somewhat reduce the negative effect of weak product market competition.