Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report Figuring out the Impact of Hidden Savings on Optimal Unemployment Insurance *
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report Figuring out the Impact of Hidden Savings on Optimal Unemployment Insurance *
复制标题
明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行研究部工作人员报告弄清楚隐藏储蓄对最佳失业保险的影响*
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
--
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
I. Werning
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Kocherlakota;Harold Cole;Russell Cooper;Barbara Mccutcheon;Chris Phelan;I. Werning
在本文中，我考虑了失业代理人寻找工作的努力不可观察且储蓄水平不可观察的世界中的最优失业保险问题。我证明一阶方法对于这个问题并不总是有效，并且我认为可用的递归过程目前在计算上不可行。尽管如此，对于努力的负效用是线性的情况，我能够提供最优契约的完整描述：代理人的消费在失业时是恒定的，当他找到工作时，会跃升至更高的恒定且与历史无关的消费水平。审稿人，尤其是编辑（理查德·罗杰森）的评论。我还要感谢我发表论文的许多研讨会的参与者。我感谢 NSF SES 0076315 的支持。本文表达的观点是作者的观点，不一定是明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行或联邦储备系统的观点。
In this paper, I consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance in a world in which the unemployed agent's job-finding effort is unobservable and his level of savings is unobservable. I show that the first-order approach is not always valid for this problem, and I argue that the available recursive procedures are not currently computationally feasible. Nonetheless, for the case in which the disutility of effort is linear, I am able to provide a complete characterization of the optimal contract: the agent's consumption is constant while he is unemployed, and jumps up to a higher constant and history-independent level of consumption when he finds a job. the referee, and especially the editor (Richard Rogerson) for their comments. I also thank the participants at the many seminars at which I presented the paper. I acknowledge the support of NSF SES 0076315. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
连续时间内隐性储蓄的委托代理问题
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
渡邊啓貴（監修）;公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム （編集）;廣瀬陽子他（著）;Tomoyuki Nakajima and Shuhei Takahashi;Miwa Hirono;今井宏平編 廣瀬陽子（第２章）;Tomoyuki Nakajima
通讯作者：
Tomoyuki Nakajima