A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices
A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices
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个性化预订价格现场指南
DOI：
10.1145/2872427.2883071
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sergei Vassilvitskii
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Leme;Martin Pál;Sergei Vassilvitskii
本文研究了在投标人不完全相同的情况下，单一物品拍卖中保留价的设定和检验问题。在高层次上，标准的第二价格拍卖有两种概括：在懒惰的版本中，我们首先确定赢家，然后应用保留价;在渴望的版本中，我们首先丢弃未达到保留价的投标人，然后在其余的人中确定赢家。我们发现，这两个版本有显着不同的属性：懒惰的储备很容易优化，和A/B测试在生产中，而渴望储备总是导致更高的福利，但他们的优化是NP完全的，和天真的A/B测试将导致不正确的结论。尽管他们的不同特点，我们表明，这两种情况下的整体收入总是在一个因素的2，即使在存在相关的出价。此外，我们还证明了无论投标人是独立的还是对称的，在收益方面，急切拍卖都优于懒惰拍卖。我们补充我们的理论结果与模拟真实的世界的数据表明，即使次优设置渴望保留价格的首选从收入的角度来看。
We study the question of setting and testing reserve prices in single item auctions when the bidders are not identical. At a high level, there are two generalizations of the standard second price auction: in the lazy version we first determine the winner, and then apply reserve prices; in the eager version we first discard the bidders not meeting their reserves, and then determine the winner among the rest. We show that the two versions have dramatically different properties: lazy reserves are easy to optimize, and A/B test in production, whereas eager reserves always lead to higher welfare, but their optimization is NP-complete, and naive A/B testing will lead to incorrect conclusions. Despite their different characteristics, we show that the overall revenue for the two scenarios is always within a factor of 2 of each other, even in the presence of correlated bids. Moreover, we prove that the eager auction dominates the lazy auction on revenue whenever the bidders are independent or symmetric. We complement our theoretical results with simulations on real world data that show that even suboptimally set eager reserve prices are preferred from a revenue standpoint.