Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation
Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation
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推理是为了争论：理解商议的成功和失败
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hélène Landemore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Mercier;Hélène Landemore
协商民主的理论家有时发现很难将心理学家和政治学家得出的看似矛盾的实验结果联系起来。我们建议，可以通过在实证结果和规范政治理论之间插入一层心理学理论来缓解这个问题。特别是，我们揭示了推理的论证理论，使观察到的发现模式更加连贯。根据这一理论，个人推理机制在公共审议期间用于产生和评估论点时效果最佳。它预测，当讨论不同意见时，群体推理将胜过个人推理。它还预测个人存在强烈的确认偏差。当人们单独推理或与志同道合的同伴推理时，这种确认偏差会导致他们强化最初的态度，从而解释个人和群体的两极分化。我们认为，推理失败最有可能在集体层面而不是个人层面得到纠正。
Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like-minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.