Through the Contested Terrain
Through the Contested Terrain
复制标题
穿过争夺地形
DOI：
10.1177/0003122416629756
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
9.1
通讯作者：
Jiwook Jung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jiwook Jung
自20世纪80年代以来，美国主要公司以股东价值最大化的名义宣布了大规模的裁员计划，但一些观察家对公司实施这些计划的认真程度表示怀疑。基于公司治理的政治理论，我研究了投资者、工人和高层管理人员之间的利益冲突和一致性如何影响已宣布的裁员计划的实施。使用1984年和2005年之间的656家公司的样本，我证明了这三个利益相关者群体对两个不同的实施结果，总的和管理裁员的对比影响。追求利润最大化的投资者的影响力促进了两者，而寻求工作保障的工人的影响力阻碍了前者，但促进了后者。试图保持管理自主权的高层管理人员的权力阻碍了管理人员的缩编，但将他们的利益与投资者利益相结合的治理机制促进了总体缩编。通过梳理竞争利益集团的影响，本文有助于组织政策执行的政治理论。通过解包裁员的实施及其对不同工人群体的潜在不平等影响，本文还有助于裁员的经济社会学和更广泛的分层文献的经济不平等和工作不安全。
Since the 1980s, leading U.S. firms have announced massive downsizing plans in the name of maximizing shareholder value, but some observers are skeptical about how serious firms are in implementing these plans. Building on political theories of corporate governance, I examine how conflicts of interest and alignment among investors, workers, and top managers affect the implementation of announced downsizing plans. Using a sample of 656 companies between 1984 and 2005, I demonstrate the contrasting influences of these three stakeholder groups on two different implementation outcomes—total and managerial downsizing. The influence of investors who pursue profit maximization facilitates both, whereas the influence of workers who seek job security impedes the former but facilitates the latter. The power of top managers who attempt to retain managerial autonomy impedes managerial downsizing, but governance mechanisms that align their interests with investor interests facilitate total downsizing. By teasing out the influences of competing interest groups, this article contributes to a political theory of organizational policy implementation. By unpacking the implementation of downsizing and its potentially unequal effects on different groups of workers, this article also contributes to the economic sociology of downsizing and the broader stratification literature on economic inequality and job insecurity.