Putin v. The People. The Perilous Politics of a Divided Russia
Putin v. The People. The Perilous Politics of a Divided Russia
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普京诉人民。
DOI：
10.1080/09668136.2019.1700711
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Yana Gorokhovskaia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yana Gorokhovskaia
在这本书中，塞缪尔·格林（Samuel Greene）和格雷姆·罗伯逊（Graeme Robertson）试图从一个新的角度来审视弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）权力的本质，这本书既关注俄罗斯公民，也关注这位担任俄罗斯最高政治职务近20年的人。利用社交媒体用户的互动、采访、政府官员泄露的电子邮件、原始调查和媒体报道，格林和罗伯逊认为，普京很强大，在很大程度上是因为他很受欢迎。这种受欢迎程度是克里姆林宫来之不易的，克里姆林宫监控和策划在线活动，依靠国家控制的媒体来传达支持政权的信息，并密切跟踪公众舆论。尽管这些技术可能足以让一个独裁者继续掌权，但格林和罗伯逊认为，俄罗斯社会中有更深层次的东西在起作用。根据政治心理学的见解，作者展示了人们之间的情感、态度和公共联系如何帮助构建关于普京权力合法性的社会共识，从而使普京能够行使这种权力。将独裁者的权力视为“共同构建”--不仅是由上层行使，而且是由下层的要求塑造的--有助于将机构重新纳入俄罗斯政治的分析中。它还在一定程度上反驳了流行但误导性的关于“俄罗斯灵魂”本质和所谓的威权主义文化倾向的论点。俄罗斯人持有各种各样的政治观点，从保守派到自由派，其他国家的公民也一样。克里姆林宫利用并放大了其中的一些意见，以动员对国家议程的支持。这一战略可能会非常成功，就像2014年吞并克里米亚一样，当时该政权能够与民族主义者结盟--此前它一直与民族主义者保持一定距离--以传播反独立广场的信息，并为自己干预乌克兰辩护。在其他时候，比如2011-2012年冬季的抗议活动，克里姆林宫严重误读了公众舆论，其反对者能够削弱普京不可战胜的看法。
IN THEIR BOOK, SAMUEL GREENE AND GRAEME ROBERTSON SET OUT to provide a new perspective on the nature of Vladimir Putin’s power, one that focuses as much on Russian citizens as on the man who has held the country’s highest political office for almost two decades. Using the interactions of social media users, interviews, leaked emails from government officials, original surveys and media reports, Greene and Robertson argue that Putin is powerful, in large part, because he is popular. This popularity has been hard won by the Kremlin, which monitors and curates online activity, relies on state-controlled media to drive home pro-regime messages, and closely tracks public opinion. Although these techniques may be sufficient to keep an autocrat in power, Greene and Robertson suggest that something deeper is at work in Russian society. Relying on insights from political psychology, the authors show how emotions, attitudes and communal links between people help to construct a social consensus about the legitimacy of Putin’s power, allowing Putin, in turn, to wield that power.Viewing an autocrat’s power as ‘co-constructed’—not only exercised from above but shaped by demands from below—helps to bring agency back into the analysis of Russian politics. It also goes some way to rebutting popular but misleading arguments about the nature of the ‘Russian soul’and supposed cultural predisposition to authoritarianism. Russians hold a myriad of political opinions, from conservative to liberal, as do the citizens of other states. The Kremlin taps into and amplifies some of these opinions in order to mobilise support for the state’s agenda. This strategy can be highly successful, as with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, when the regime was able to align with nationalists—a group it had previously held at arm’s length—to spread anti-Maidan messages and justify its own intervention in Ukraine. At other times, as during the 2011–2012 winter of protests, the Kremlin badly misread public opinion and its opponents were able to chip away at the perception of Putin’s invincibility.