Structuring evaluations of parliamentary processes by the European Court of Human Rights
Structuring evaluations of parliamentary processes by the European Court of Human Rights
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欧洲人权法院对议会程序的评估
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Saul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Saul
在最近的一些判决中，议会程序的质量一直是欧洲人权法院的一个相关因素。本文提出的问题是：评估议会程序的技术目的——增值幅度和/或比例分析——在多大程度上可以构成评估？分析将法院实践研究与升值幅度理论和比例检验理论相结合。本文选择了四个案例来代表法院处理议会程序的不同方式：国际动物保护协会诉英国案；苏霍维茨基诉乌克兰案；林德海姆诉挪威；帕里略诉意大利案。主要的论点是，法院在其推理中对提及议会程序的技术目的一直很模糊。这影响了案件推理的连贯性和关于评估议会进程的一般原则的发展。对法院的合法性感兴趣并赞成重视议会程序的法官应努力在法院的推理中更清楚地解释它所服务的技术目的。
The quality of parliamentary process has been a relevant factor for the European Court of Human Rights in a number of recent judgments. This article asks: to what extent could the technical purpose for assessing parliamentary process – margin of appreciation and/or proportionality analysis – structure the assessment? The analysis combines study of the court’s practice with theory on the margin of appreciation and the proportionality test. Four cases are selected to represent different ways in which parliamentary process has been dealt with by the court: Animal Defenders International v. UK; Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine; Lindheim v. Norway; and Parrillo v. Italy. The main argument is that the court has been hazy about the technical purpose that reference to parliamentary process is serving in its reasoning. This has affected the coherence of reasoning within cases and the development of a general doctrine on the assessment of parliamentary process. Judges interested in the legitimacy of the court and in favour of placing value in parliamentary process should work towards clearer explanation of the technical purpose it serves within the court’s reasoning.