Cost Incentives for Doctors: A Double-Edged Sword

Cost Incentives for Doctors: A Double-Edged Sword
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对医生的成本激励：一把双刃剑

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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
Christoph Schottmüller
Christoph Schottmüller
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Christoph Schottmüller

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如果医生在开药时考虑治疗费用，他们的目标就会与患者的目标不同，因为患者有保险。这种利益不一致阻碍了患者和医生之间的沟通。如果（i）医生的检查技术足够好或（ii）治疗的（边际）成本足够高，则向医生提供成本激励会增加福利。如果规划者可以无成本地选择医生考虑成本的程度，他会选择低于100%的。最佳的医疗保健系统应根据疾病类型和/或医生实施不同程度的成本激励措施。
If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.