Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001
复制
发表时间：
2007-09-01
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Yamagishia, Toshio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shinada, Mizuho;Yamagishia, Toshio
一大群基因无关的人之间的合作是一个进化难题。尽管合作行为代价高昂，但它在所有人类社会中普遍存在——这一事实引起了包括生物学、经济学和心理学在内的众多学科的研究人员的兴趣。许多行为实验表明，当搭便车者受到惩罚时，群体内的合作可以持续下去。我们认为惩罚对促进合作有直接作用和间接作用。惩罚的直接作用改变了合作和背叛的结果，使理性的人更倾向于合作。惩罚的间接效应通过提供合作的必要条件（即期望其他成员也会合作）来促进有条件合作者之间的合作。本文采用了两个单次n人囚徒困境博弈的数据，证明了在博弈中，惩罚的间接效应对增加合作的直接效应是互补的。此外，我们表明，直接和间接效应在两种形式的惩罚技术中都是稳健的：当惩罚是由游戏参与者自己自愿提供的，或者当惩罚是由实验者外生提供的。(C) 2007爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
Human cooperation in a large group of genetically unrelated people is an evolutionary puzzle. Despite its costly nature, cooperative behavior is commonly found in all human societies-a fact that has interested researchers from a wide range of disciplines, including biology, economics, and psychology, to name a few. Many behavioral experiments have demonstrated that cooperation within a group can be sustained when free riders are punished. We argue that punishment has both a direct effect and an indirect effect on promoting cooperation. The direct effect of punishment alters the consequences of cooperation and defection in such a way as to make a rational person prefer cooperation. The indirect effect of punishment promotes cooperation among conditional cooperators by providing the condition necessary for their cooperation (i.e., the expectation that other members will also cooperate). Here we present data from two one-shot n-person prisoner's dilemma games, demonstrating that the indirect effect of punishment complements the direct effect to increase cooperation in the game. Furthermore, we show that direct and indirect effects are robust across two forms of punishment technology: either when punishment is voluntarily provided by game players themselves or when it is exogenously provided by the experimenter. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.