Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics
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牛津数字伦理手册

DOI:
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.4
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Cruft R
Cruft R
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作者:
Cruft R

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有些人声称,上网是一种道德权利,也许是一种人权;另一些人则声称,不上网也是一种道德权利。这两种说法并不矛盾,但都受到政府政策的挑战,例如,要求选民登记或残疾福利在线申请,或者通过请愿书为在线民主参与提供独特的舞台。这些政策是否直接或通过第三方影响侵犯了那些选择无网络生活或无法负担互联网接入的人的人权?本章将评估“权利”和“人权”的概念是否是处理这些问题的有用的道德-法律概念。这一领域的价值观民主参与、言论自由、隐私、福利国家的理念通常被理解为权利,但它们也常常被更普遍地理解为道德基础,从根本上说,它们在构建一个为我们所有人服务的开放社会中所起的作用。权利方法强调个人作为一方谁是'冤枉'时,违反了义务。这一章捍卫了一个基于权利的方法来解决有关互联网接入的道德问题,这是一个有用的方法。本章探讨了这种方法对政策和法律的实际影响,包括人权法,特别侧重于人们可以在多大程度上被强迫成为“网民”,以及网络排斥应被理解为对被排斥者的不公正。
SOME claim that access to the internet is a moral right, perhaps a human right; others claim that there is also a moral right to remain offline. The two claims are not inconsistent, but both are challenged by government policies that, for instance, require voter registration or disability benefits to be claimed online, or that provide distinctive arenas for online democratic participation through petitions. Do these policies either directly, or through thirdparty effects, violate the human rights of those who choose web-free lives, or who cannot afford internet access? This chapter will assess whether the ideas of'rights' and'human rights' are useful moral-legal concepts for getting to grips with these issues. The values in this area—democratic participation, freedom of speech, privacy, the idea of a welfare state—are often understood in terms of rights, but they are also often taken more communally, as morally grounded fundamentally by their role in constituting an open society that serves us all collectively. Rights approaches highlight the individual as a party who is' wronged'when a duty is violated. This chapter defends a rights-based approach to moral questions about internet access-as one useful approach among others. The chapter explores the practical implications of this approach for policy and law, including human rights law, focusing especially on the extent to which people can justifiably be compelled to become'netizens' and the ways in which web exclusions should be understood as wronging those who are excluded.