Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics
Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics
复制标题
牛津数字伦理手册
DOI:
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.4
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Cruft R
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Cruft R
SOME claim that access to the internet is a moral right, perhaps a human right; others claim that there is also a moral right to remain offline. The two claims are not inconsistent, but both are challenged by government policies that, for instance, require voter registration or disability benefits to be claimed online, or that provide distinctive arenas for online democratic participation through petitions. Do these policies either directly, or through thirdparty effects, violate the human rights of those who choose web-free lives, or who cannot afford internet access? This chapter will assess whether the ideas of'rights' and'human rights' are useful moral-legal concepts for getting to grips with these issues. The values in this area—democratic participation, freedom of speech, privacy, the idea of a welfare state—are often understood in terms of rights, but they are also often taken more communally, as morally grounded fundamentally by their role in constituting an open society that serves us all collectively. Rights approaches highlight the individual as a party who is' wronged'when a duty is violated. This chapter defends a rights-based approach to moral questions about internet access-as one useful approach among others. The chapter explores the practical implications of this approach for policy and law, including human rights law, focusing especially on the extent to which people can justifiably be compelled to become'netizens' and the ways in which web exclusions should be understood as wronging those who are excluded.