Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: Dissociation between first- and third-person perspectives on body ownership
Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: Dissociation between first- and third-person perspectives on body ownership
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DOI：
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.011
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发表时间：
2011-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Kopelman, Michael D.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fotopoulou, Aikaterini;Jenkinson, Paul Mark;Kopelman, Michael D.
右半球中风会导致躯体妄想症，认为自己身体的一部分属于别人。据我们所知，没有以前的研究实验评估的感觉身体部分的所有权在躯体妄想症患者从第三人称的角度来看，如在一面镜子。在交替试验中，我们提供了手臂的直接第一人称视角，或通过额面镜子的间接第三人称视角。我们测试了身体所有权在这些条件下，在5例右半球病变与左偏瘫和忽视，包括两名患者与这种躯体妄想。与三名对照患者相比，躯体偏执患者系统地将其瘫痪左手的所有权归因于直视下的其他人，但在镜像试验中显示，与三名对照患者相比，对左手的所有权在统计学上显着增加。根据提供的视图（镜像或直接），对同一肢体的所有权和非所有权的判断可以在几秒钟内交替。病人并没有特别注意到这些戏剧性的和反复的所有权和剥夺之间的变化。在直视和镜像观察的条件下，实验者同时用手触摸，结果与没有触摸的条件相同。这项研究提供了第一个实验证据，表明肢体剥夺可以通过对镜子的自我观察来改变，反过来又表明第一人称和第三人称对身体的视觉视角之间的分离。此外，通过第三人称视角恢复所有权并没有永久地消除躯体妄想症，这一事实表明，身体所有权的主观感觉仍然由身体的受损第一人称表征主导，这种表征无法更新，也无法与其他信号整合。更一般地说，我们的研究结果表明，涉及大脑右半球的大脑外侧裂周围区域的神经网络可能是必要的，以整合一个人的身体的多种表征和更高阶的各种身体信号的重新表示成第一人称的身体所有权感。我们认为，其他地区，可能包括枕叶皮质，可能参与了从第三人称视觉的角度来识别身体。因此，我们提出，躯体妄想症可以被视为一种神经源性的分离之间的“主观感觉”和“客观看到”的身体。这让人想起了一个发展发现，即年幼的婴儿无法将他们的“感觉身体”与镜子中的自己联系起来。(C)2011爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Right-hemisphere stroke can lead to the somatoparaphrenic delusion that parts of one's own body belong to someone else. To our knowledge, no previous study has experimentally assessed the sense of body part ownership in somatoparaphrenic patients when they see the body from a third-person perspective, as in a mirror. In alternating trials, we provided either direct first-person perspective vision of the arms, or indirect third-person perspective vision via a mirror in the frontal plane. We tested body ownership in these conditions in five patients with right-hemisphere lesions with left hemiplegia and neglect, including two patients with this somatoparaphrenic delusion. The somatoparaphrenic patients systematically attributed the ownership of their left plegic hands to someone else in direct view, but showed a statistically significant increase in ownership of the left hand in mirror view trials, as compared with the three control patients. Depending on the view offered (mirror or direct), judgements of ownership and disownership of the same limb could alternate within a few seconds. The patients did not particularly remark on these dramatic and repeated alterations between ownership and disownership. Conditions of direct- and mirror-view with simultaneous touch of the hand by the experimenter showed the same patterns of results as conditions without touch. This study provides the first experimental evidence that limb disownership can be altered using self-observation in a mirror, and in turn suggests dissociation between first- and third-person visual perspectives on the body. Furthermore, the fact that reinstatement of ownership by third-person perspective did not permanently abolish somatoparaphrenia suggests that the subjective sense of body ownership remained dominated by an impaired first-person representation of the body that could not be updated, nor integrated with other signals. More generally, our findings suggest that a neural network involving the perisylvian areas of the right hemisphere may be necessary for the integration of multiple representations of one's body and for a higher order re-representation of various bodily signals into a first-person sense of body ownership. We suggest that other areas, possibly including the occipital cortex, may be involved in the recognition of the body from a third-person visual perspective. We thus propose that somatoparaphrenia can be regarded as a neurogenic dissociation between the 'subjectively felt' and 'objectively seen' body. This recalls the developmental finding that young infants cannot link their 'felt body' with the view of themselves in a mirror. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.