Managerial power, perquisite consumption and the efficiency of property right system: Evidence from Chinese listed companies
Managerial power, perquisite consumption and the efficiency of property right system: Evidence from Chinese listed companies
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DOI：
10.1007/s11782-010-0102-3
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发表时间：
2010-08
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Rui Lu;Minghai Wei;Wenjing Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rui Lu;Minghai Wei;Wenjing Li
本研究利用2001-2004年中国上市公司的数据，从CEO二元性、股权分散和高管长期任期三个角度，检验了管理层权力对在职消费和企业绩效的影响。结果表明，管理权力越高的企业，其在职消费越高，但绩效并没有相应提高。此外，任职消费不能对管理者产生有效的激励，非国有控股上市公司的管理层权力更大，任职消费更高，业绩不如国有控股上市公司。结果还表明，管理层权力是影响薪酬激励的重要因素。
This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2001–2004 to test the effects of managerial power on perquisite consumption and firm performance from the perspectives of CEO duality, ownership dispersion and long-term tenure of top executives. Results show that companies with higher managerial power tend to incur higher perquisite consumption, while their performance does not improve accordingly. Moreover, perquisite consumption fails to offer effective incentives to managers, and non-state-controlled listed companies have greater managerial power, higher perquisite consumption, and worse performance than that of their state-controlled peers. Results also show that managerial power is an important factor influencing compensation incentive.