40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis
40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-020-09679-3
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发表时间：
2020-10-20
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Malezieux, Antoine
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alm, James;Malezieux, Antoine
我们收集了来自70篇论文的个人参与者数据，这些论文使用实验室实验来检验个人逃税行为（或“逃税游戏”），以便使用元分析来估计不同的公共政策，实验设计和个人层面变量对逃税选择的影响。我们的结果表明，审计（包括审计规则）和罚款等标准执行变量在广泛和密集边际上的表现不同。我们发现，其他财政变量，如单一税制、税率和税收特赦，对税收合规性有明确的负面影响，而实验环境的具体特征，如受试者如何报告收入，或者税收是否重新分配给参与者或现实生活中的公共产品，对税收合规性有显著影响。我们的研究结果还表明，受试者的人口统计学特征（如性别、实验收入、职业、风险态度）影响依从性。
We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or "Tax Evasion Games"), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.