The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media
The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media
复制标题
社交媒体上的分歧问题
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192893338.003.0015
复制
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Elizabeth Edenberg
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Elizabeth Edenberg
Intractable political disagreements threaten to fracture the common ground upon which we can build a political community. The deepening divisions in society are partly fueled by the ways social media has shaped political engagement. Social media allows us to sort ourselves into increasingly likeminded groups, consume information from different sources, and end up in polarized and insular echo chambers. To solve this, many argue for various ways of cultivating more responsible epistemic agency. This chapter argues that this epistemic lens does not reveal the complete picture and therefore misses a form of moral respect required to reestablish cooperation across disagreements in a divided society. The breakdown of discourse online provides renewed reasons to draw out not an epistemic but a moral basis for political cooperation among diverse citizens—one inspired by Rawlsian political liberalism. We need ways to cultivate mutual respect for our fellow citizens in order to reestablish common moral ground for political debate. Contemporary political discourse often feels like a battleground between diametrically opposed worldviews. Today our intractable disagreements have surfaced in nasty ways, persistently threatening to fracture the very ground upon which we build political community. Complicating this broader disagreement on questions of morality are new challenges to agreement on basic facts about our world (Kappel 2017, 2018; SinnottArmstrong 2018). Much of this division is fueled by the new ways we access information, namely through digital means increasingly tailored to show us what we want to see. Social media allows us to sort ourselves into increasingly likeminded groups, who consume information from different sources, and end up in polarized and insular echo chambers of our own making. In response, many have called for new social media literacy campaigns, flagging questionable news sources, increased fact checking, and other ways to correct inaccuracies that spread online (Crowell 2017; Mosseri 2017; Breakstone et al. 2019; Tugend 2020). These approaches attempt to bridge political divides by improving our epistemic capacity to responsibly assess information online. Philosophers have also begun to weigh in on this issue, diagnosing the deeper epistemic failures that underlie intractable political disagreements and suggesting ways to correct them (Lynch 2016 and 2019; Rini 2017; Kappel 2017; Cassam 2019). What these approaches have in common is the idea that both the problem and the solution are grounded in epistemology: political disagreement online is an epistemic failure in need of an epistemic solution. If only we could shore up individuals’ epistemic capacities and our collective epistemic resources, we could return to agreeing on the facts, if not the values, relevant to politics. I will argue that this epistemic approach does not show us the complete picture and thus misses a more basic form of moral respect required for reestablishing a common ground for cooperation across disagreements in a divided society. Efforts rooted in improving
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2008
期刊:
情報処理学会第70回全国大会講演集 (電子媒体)
影响因子:
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作者:
綱島広顕;藤田悠;鈴木治郎;鈴木治郎;鈴木治郎
通讯作者:
鈴木治郎