Integrated Configuration of Platform Products and Supply Chains for Mass Customization: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Integrated Configuration of Platform Products and Supply Chains for Mass Customization: A Game-Theoretic Approach
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DOI：
10.1109/tem.2006.889074
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发表时间：
2007-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
G. Huang;Xinyan Zhang;V. Lo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Huang;Xinyan Zhang;V. Lo
本文采用三步动态博弈方法研究了由一个制造商和多个供应商组成的平台产品及其供应链的配置优化问题。产品系列中的变体共享一个用于开发/配置变体模块的通用平台，这些变体模块是可替代的，因为高端模块选项可以在功能上以更高的价格取代低端模块选项。作为供应链中的客户，制造商在平台产品开发（PPD）和供应商选择方面发挥着主导作用。相关供应商采取第二步行动来优化他们的决策，包括价格折扣和他们的订购政策。制造商通过采取最后一步来做出他的订购决定来结束游戏。通过对博弈者支付模型的分析，得出了博弈者理性反应的范围，并利用逆向归纳法给出了求解子博弈完美均衡的枚举算法。通过一系列的仿真实验和灵敏度分析，使用一个数值例子的博弈模型和建议的解决方案的过程进行说明。研究结果使我们能够得出一些有意义的解释和有用的管理见解。平台通用性和模块化的使用通常不仅对整个供应链有利，而且对最终被配置到游戏中的个体玩家也有利。供应商能力的灵活性也会影响PPD决策
This paper is concerned with optimizing the configuration of a set of platform products and the associated supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers using a three-move dynamic game-theoretic approach. The variants in the product family share a common platform for developing/configuring variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-end module options can functionally replace low-end ones at higher prices. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to give decisions on platform products development (PPD) and supplier selection. The concerned suppliers make the second move to optimize their decisions including price discounts and their ordering policies. The manufacturer finishes the game by taking the last move to make his ordering decisions. The ranges of the rational reactions for the players are derived from the analyses of their payoff models, and an enumerative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game through the technique of backward induction. The game model and the proposed solution procedure are illustrated through a series of simulation experiments and sensitivity analyses using a numerical example. The results have allowed us to draw some meaningful interpretations and useful managerial insights. The use of platform commonality and modularity has been found generally beneficial not only to the supply chain as a whole but also to individual players that are eventually configured into the game. Flexibility of the suppliers' capability is also found to affect the PPD decisions