Health Insurance and Mortality: Experimental Evidence from Taxpayer Outreach

Health Insurance and Mortality: Experimental Evidence from Taxpayer Outreach
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3496282
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发表时间:
2019-11
期刊:
Randomized Social Experiments eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Jacob Goldin;I. Lurie;Janet Mccubbin
Jacob Goldin;I. Lurie;Janet Mccubbin
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jacob Goldin;I. Lurie;Janet Mccubbin

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我们评估了一项随机外展研究,其中美国国税局向 390 万个家庭发送了信息信,这些家庭因缺乏《平价医疗法案》规定的医疗保险而缴纳了税收罚款。利用行政数据,我们研究了这种干预措施对纳税人随后的医疗保险参保率和死亡率的影响。我们发现,干预措施在随后两年内提高了覆盖率,并降低了同期中年成年人的死亡率。结果提供了实验证据,证明健康保险覆盖可以降低美国的死亡率。
We evaluate a randomized outreach study in which the IRS sent informational letters to 3.9 million households that paid a tax penalty for lacking health insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Drawing on administrative data, we study the effect of this intervention on taxpayers’ subsequent health insurance enrollment and mortality. We find the intervention led to increased coverage during the subsequent two years and reduced mortality among middle-aged adults over the same time period. The results provide experimental evidence that health insurance coverage can reduce mortality in the United States.