Impacts of decision sequences on a random yield supply chain with a service level requirement
Impacts of decision sequences on a random yield supply chain with a service level requirement
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决策序列对具有服务水平要求的随机产量供应链的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s10479-016-2275-4
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Liu Mengqi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He Bo;Li Guo;Liu Mengqi
在过去的十年里，社会网络结构的趋势越来越明显，决策可能会受到成员的渠道权力的影响。本文考虑了一个分散供应链，其中包括一个随机产量的供应商和一个制造商的服务水平要求。供应商决定生产数量，而制造商决定补货数量。我们研究了几个博弈论模型的决策序列的供应商和制造商的服务水平的要求。我们比较了这些模型下企业的均衡生产/订货量和利润。从渠道结构的角度来看，厂商与领导者的博弈是帕累托有效的。在服务水平上观察到一个临界值，超过该临界值，供应商的利润减少，而制造商的利润在服务水平要求中增加。有趣的是，临界值与模型无关，它只取决于批发价格和生产成本。我们还研究了供应商管理库存安排下的分散随机产量供应链。最后，数值计算进行评估供应链绩效的各种参数。
The last decade has witnessed a rising trend of social network structures where decision making may be influenced by members’ channel power. This paper considers a decentralized supply chain that comprises a random yield supplier and a manufacturer with a service level requirement. The supplier determines the production quantity while the manufacturer decides on the replenishment quantity. We investigate several game-theoretic models with respect to decision sequences of the supplier and manufacturer with a service level requirement. We compare firms’ equilibrium production/order quantity and profits under these models. Both firms achieve a higher payoff in the manufacturer-leader game than in the supplier-leader and simultaneous move games, which indicates that the manufacturer-leader game is Pareto efficient from the channel structure perspective. A critical value is observed at the service level, beyond which the supplier’s profit decreases, while the manufacturer’s profit increases in the service level requirement. Interestingly, the critical value is independent of the models and it just depends on the wholesale price and production cost. We also examine the decentralized random yield supply chain under the vendor-managed inventory arrangement. Finally, numerical computations are conducted to evaluate supply chain performance with respect to various parameters.